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 Recent scholarship on paternalism has rarely strayed from John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty, in 
which the protection of liberty and respect for individual exercises of reason are offered as the only 
grounds for justifying paternalistic government interference in individuals’ private affairs.  However, 
Mill’s restricted universe of moral discourse cannot exhaust the moral economy from which we draw 
when justifying government interference, including paternalistic interference, given pluralist 
commitments.  If we are committed to pluralism, then we must accept 1) that normally competent, 
rational adults will inevitably disagree about what the good life entails, and these disagreements 
cannot be resolved on the basis of reason alone and 2) that citizens could consent to paternalistic 
interference for a plurality of reasons which are not reducible to liberty.  I suggest that paternalistic 
mitigation of certain kinds of individual vulnerability offers an example of justified paternalism 
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The past forty years of scholarship on paternalism have been dominated by John Stuart Mill.  
Work seeking to establish exactly why paternalism strikes us as prima facie objectionable, and 
whether and when government paternalism might be justified, rarely strays very far from On Liberty.
1
  
This scholarship has taught us much about the relationship between states and citizens and how 
thoroughly pervasive the questions of liberty and reason are in political thought.  However, in this 
article I want to broaden the moral horizon, because neither liberty nor reason is able to capture all of 
the basic moral sensibilities which may convince us that paternalistic interference is justified.  
Without diminishing the value of earlier efforts, I want to suggest how and why we should move 
beyond Mill in our continued theorizing about paternalism. 
 The core of my argument is that pluralist commitments have implications for the project of 
public justification that blunt Mill’s objection to paternalism.a  In particular, if we are committed to 
pluralism, then we must accept 1) that normally competent, rational adults will inevitably disagree 
about what the good life entails, and these disagreements cannot be resolved on the basis of reason 
alone; and 2) that citizens could consent to paternalistic interference for many reasons which are not 
reducible to liberty.  Contrary to trends in the paternalistic literature, most of my analysis will focus 
on the process of public justification itself.  This analysis shows that two famous qualifications to the 
prohibition of paternalism in On Liberty involve presuppositions about how laws are justified which 
run aground of pluralist commitments.  For each instance of interference, public justification 
arguments for pluralists entertain a plurality of reasons for consenting to the interference and specify 
in context which relevant public must consent for the interference to be justified.  The paternalism 
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 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays, ed. John Gray (Oxford, 2008). 
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literature shows how fruitful are considerations of liberty as a justifying reason and rational 
individuals as a relevant public, but my aim is to suggest that these topics do not (and cannot, if we 
are committed to pluralism) exhaust the moral economy from which we draw when consenting to 
government interference, including paternalistic interference. 
 The essay proceeds in three parts.  In the first part I briefly sketch Mill’s treatment of 
paternalism and show how it has shaped the paternalism literature since Joel Feinberg’s 1971 essay 
“Legal Paternalism.”2  In the second part I analyze public justification of government interference in 
light of pluralist commitments.  In the third part, I show how distancing ourselves from Mill enables 
justificatory arguments to better capture our basic moral sensibilities about paternalistic interference, 
using the example of the Federal Food, Drugs, and Cosmetic Act of 1938. 
 
II. MILL AND PATERNALISM 
 
The first three words of a 2013 edited volume on paternalism are “John Stuart Mill.”3  The 
editors, Christian Coons and Michael Weber, situate the volume in terms of Mill’s famous rejection 
of paternalism in On Liberty: 
 
[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in 
interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection.  That 
the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a 
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.  His own good, 
either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant (On Liberty, 14). 
 
 
After mentioning only very briefly (in two sentences) the nature of some of the most common 
responses to Mill’s absolute prohibition on paternalism, Coons and Weber suggest that “[t]his mere 
snippet from the historical debate is enough to show that paternalism is a topic that engages deep 
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philosophical issues in normative ethics and political philosophy, including the significance and 
nature of freedom and autonomy, and the relation between individuals and the state” (1). 
 Coons and Weber are right to characterize the great majority of all paternalism scholarship of the 
past four decades as a response to this statement of Mill’s.  Nearly every chapter of the edited volume 
engages Mill in one way or another, and this tendency can be traced backward through the 
paternalism literature to two early essays from the 1970s: Joel Feinberg’s “Legal Paternalism” (1971), 
an essay-length introduction to his massively influential book Harm to Self (1986), and Gerald 
Dworkin’s “Paternalism” (1972).4  A full analysis of the extant literature and the various methods 
political theorists and philosophers have used to argue against Mill are beyond the scope of this paper.  
My goal is merely to mark out the conceptual territory in which these battles have been waged, and to 
do so I turn directly to Mill.  Despite the absolution of the above-quoted prohibition on paternalism, 
Mill defines two different cases in which paternalistic interference would be justifiable: when 
interference doesn’t interrupt rationally chosen actions and when interference delivers greater net 
liberty to the person whose liberty is initially curtailed by the interference.  I refer to these as the 
“broken bridge” and the “slave contract.”  It is in the restricted context of these exceptions to Mill’s 
general proscription of paternalism that paternalist literature has more or less remained – a trend that I 
hope to interrupt in this essay. 
 
II.1: Mill’s argument against government paternalism 
  Mill’s position against government interference, and paternalistic interference especially, has 
two primary components: liberty of opinion and liberty of action.  He argues in Chapter 2 of On 
Liberty that we ought to protect individuals’ freedom to think and form beliefs, because the existence 
of uncustomary intellectual perspectives benefits the pursuit of truth in general.
5
  Freedom of thought 
accomplishes this in two ways.  First, “even if the world is in the right, it is always probable that 
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dissentients have something worth hearing to say for themselves, and that truth would lose something 
by their silence” (54).  As a general rule, we should assume all viewpoints contain a kernel of truth, 
and silencing dissenters throws the baby out with the bath water.  But Mill presses the issue even 
further by suggesting that dissenting viewpoints are strictly required for the establishment of positive 
beliefs in the first place: 
 
He who knows only his own side of the case, knows little of that.  His reasons may be 
good, and no one may be able to refute them.  But if he is equally unable to refute the 
opposite side; if he does not so much as know what they are, he has no ground for 




 Freedom of thought is beneficial in a second way because truth itself is only valuable to those 
who discover it themselves (often by following a path of frequent error): 
 
No one can be a great thinker who does not recognize, that as a thinker it is his first 
duty to follow his intellect to whatever conclusions it may lead.  Truth gains more 
even by the errors of one who, with due study and preparation, thinks for himself, 
than by the true opinions of those who only hold them because they do not suffer 
themselves to think.  [I]t is . . . indispensable, to enable average human beings to 
attain the mental stature which they are capable of (39). 
 
 
Freedom of thought should thus be protected because it is only through the imperfect individual 
pursuit of knowledge that truth comes to have any value to the one who holds it, and because the 
existence of opposed viewpoints is required for the individual pursuit of knowledge to be possible. 
 In addition to freedom of thought, Mill argues that individuals’ due liberty extends to actions, at 
least in those cases in which individuals’ actions concern no one but the actors themselves (14, 83-84, 
104).  One reason we should respect individuals’ free agency, like their freedom of thought, is 
because the value of their lived decisions depends upon their having chosen them for themselves; “if 
a person possesses any tolerable amount of common sense and experience, his own mode of laying 
out his existence is the best, not because it is the best in itself, but because it is his own mode” (75).  
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Unlike in the case of truth (which Mill seems to treat as objective), people’s good lives may 
genuinely differ: 
 
Such are the differences among human beings in their sources of pleasure, their 
susceptibilities of pain, and the operation on them of different physical and moral 
agencies, that unless there is a corresponding diversity in their modes of life, they 
neither obtain their fair share of happiness, nor grow up to the mental, moral, and 
aesthetic stature of which their nature is capable (75-76). 
 
 
 Independent of axiological considerations, Mill is attentive to practical institutional limitations to 
benevolent government interference; “the strongest of all the arguments against the interference of the 
public with purely personal conduct, is that when it does interfere, the odds are that it interferes 
wrongly, and in the wrong place” (92).  This worry is supported by a number of empirical 
generalizations.  First, Mill thinks that individuals are epistemically advantaged with respect to their 
own goods; the government is simply not in a position to know what is in each individual’s best 
interest (93).  Second, the surest way to obtain a good is to put someone with a vested interest in 
obtaining the good in charge of its pursuit.  Individuals – and not the government – have this kind of 
special interest in their own goods (121).  Third, Mill argues that individuals benefit from making 
their own way, even if they make mistakes, because people learn from their negative experiences how 
better to live their lives (121).  Finally, fourth, Mill is worried that enabling the government to 
interfere in the private lives of individuals – even when the state has the best intentions and is 
occasionally able to deliver good outcomes – will involve a dangerous inflation of state capacity 
(122) that is both inefficient (126) and attracts to government offices dangerously ambitious people 
with aspirations of domination (122). 
 Mill’s argument against government paternalism thus has three freestanding components.  First, 
he argues that the free exercise of reason generates the value of truth for individuals, so the state 
harms individuals when it interferes with their freedom of thought.  Second, he argues that 
individuals’ free agency generates (at least some of) the value their lives have to them, so the state 
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harms individuals when it interferes in their free actions.  Third, even if the state theoretically could 
do more good than harm to individuals through interference with their private lives, Mill is convinced 
that the state is nevertheless practically incapable of doing so.   
Mill’s three complaints against paternalism generate two different categories of cases in which 
paternalism ought to be accepted, which he outlines in On Liberty and which paternalists have 
leveraged extensively.  If the government is not to interfere with private exercises of reason, then 
there is no presumptive problem with the government interfering with the private lives of citizens 
where they are not exercising their reason (given that the state is able to overcome the practical 
dangers intervention presents).  If the government is to protect individual liberty, then paternalistic 
interference which secures increased net liberty to the individual is acceptable (again, provided the 
state can do so without generating the kinds of practical problems Mill outlines).  Mill thinks these 
kinds of situations do arise, and that they are the only cases in which paternalistic intervention is 
justifiable. 
 
II.2: The broken bridge 
 
[I]t is a proper office of public authority to guard against accidents.  If either a 
public officer or any one else saw a person attempting to cross a bridge which had 
been ascertained to be unsafe, and there were no time to warn him of his danger, 
they might seize him and turn him back, without any real infringement of his liberty; 




The state is justified in interfering with individuals’ uninformed or irrational decisions.  For 
rational adults, such intervention is justified to the limited extent that it is undergone to warn 
individuals of the risky consequences of their actions, not to coercively prevent them from exposing 
themselves to risk (107).  However, Mill adds an important caveat: the state oughtn’t interfere “unless 
he is a child, or delirious, or in some state of excitement or absorption incompatible with the full use 
of the reflecting faculty” (107). 
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Mill moves quickly on from the bridge case to an example of drugs with potentially dangerous 
effects, in which he suggests that “labelling the drug with some word expressive of its dangerous 
character, may be enforced without violation of liberty: the buyer cannot wish not to know that the 
thing he possesses has poisonous qualities” (107).  The broken bridge and dangerous drug examples, 
together with Mill’s qualified types of individuals with whom the state is apparently justified in 
interfering, suggest that Mill has in mind a special relationship among reason, knowledge, and liberty.  
The exercise of liberty requires knowledge of pertinent information, so the state is generally justified 
in interfering with individuals at least for the sake of educating them about the consequences of their 
private actions.  But knowledge isn’t enough; the exercise of liberty requires one to have the capacity 
to make a rational decision in light of relevant information.  Thus, when Mill says a buyer strictly 
“cannot” wish to remain ignorant of a drug’s toxicity, he is suggesting that a rational buyer, “with the 
full use of the reflecting faculty,” would not wish to remain so ignorant.  On this line of reasoning, 
paternalistic intervention is justified in these special situations because such intervention doesn’t 
really interfere with the individual’s liberty, insofar as “liberty consists in doing what one rationally 
desires.” 
Much has been made of the appeal to rational desires.  Providing an account of what individuals 
would want, if only they were better informed or more rational, has been a dominant strategy for 
justifying paternalism.  For example, the extent to which individuals’ interrupted behaviors are 
rational features centrally in Joel Feinberg’s “Legal Paternalism,” where he sketches his famous 
distinction between “strong” and “weak” paternalism:6   
 
According to the strong version of legal paternalism, the state is justified in 
protecting a person, against his will, from the harmful consequences even of his fully 
voluntary
7
 choices and undertakings. . . . According to the weaker version of legal 
paternalism, a man can rightly be prevented from harming himself (when other 
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interests are not directly involved) only if his intended action is substantially 
nonvoluntary. . . . The “harm to others” principle, after all, permits us to protect a 
man from the choices of other people; weak paternalism would permit us to protect 
him from “nonvoluntary choices,” which, being the choices of no one at all, are no 
less foreign to him (124). 
 
 
Feinberg suggests that strong paternalism is (almost) never justifiable because people’s exercises of 
reason in matters that concern only themselves are too precious a thing to interfere with (111).
8,b
 
 The rational agent line of reasoning in the broken bridge case has more recently become the 
topic of intense interest thanks to Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein’s Nudge (2003).9  In Nudge, 
Thaler and Sunstein ask us to imagine ourselves as composite personalities.  On the one hand, normal 
adult people are rational agents capable of making educated, calculated decisions about their desires 
and goals, and their decisions ought to be respected by the state and others (at least insofar as those 
decisions have the potential only to harm the individuals themselves).  Call this part of our split 
personality the homo economicus, or Econ.  On the other hand, normal adult people are quite bad at 
making decisions in certain contexts.  What should be merely irrelevant features of a choice context 
to a rational agent tend to lead us into errors that prevent us from achieving our own goals.  Call this 
part of our split personality the homo sapien, or Human (7). 
Thaler and Sunstein mobilize social scientific research to show that Humans make repeated, 
predictable, and costly mistakes in their daily lives that, if they were thinking more rationally, they 
would agree are not aligned with their own life goals.  Nudge asks whether the state might 
paternalistically intervene at the points when people tend to make such mistakes by modifying the 
architecture of the decision context itself, manipulating the Humans in us to (nonrationally) behave in 
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 For the purposes of this paper, I roughly take paternalism to mean “delivering a good to people whether they 
want it or not.”  “Government paternalism” refers to the state of affairs where the government attempts to 
deliver a good to citizens whether the citizens want it or not.  See the endnote for more information on how my 
definition differs from Feinberg’s.  My usage of paternalism is crudely derived from an analogy between the 
relationship between parents and children and the relationship between the state and its citizens.  Refer to the 
appendix for this derivation. 
9
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a way that’s better aligned with the way the Econs in us wish the Humans would behave (11-14).  For 
Thaler and Sunstein, Feinberg, and Mill, interventions of this sort are justifiable because there’s no 
moral problem with interfering with irrational behaviors. 
One cannot overstate the importance of the broken bridge case to paternalism scholarship.
10
  
Before moving on to a second massively influential Millian contribution to our thinking about 
paternalism, I want to point out an important implication the broken bridge has for the justification of 
paternalism.  If we accept Mill’s argument that it’s individuals’ behaving rationally that protects them 
from government interference (and the paternalism literature from Feinberg to Nudge for the most 
part has accepted this argument), then we reveal a crucial criticism against paternalistic interference: 
if a particular paternalistic intervention threatens to foreclose
11
 on a life that a rational agent could 
affirm, then it is unjustifiable.  In other words, the broken bridge case creates a thin category of 
justifiable paternalistic interference with behavior that cannot be affirmed by any rational agent.  The 
forcefulness of this limitation of justified paternalism depends on our accepting Mill’s moral 
evaluation of rationality, something paternalists have historically been too ready to do.  As I argue 
below, it is not self-evident that relatively more rational agents ought to enjoy political protections 
unavailable to the rest of us, whose actions are as readily explained by emotion, habit, and non-
reflection as by the exercise of Millian reason. 
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 A few references which treat this issue directly are Coons and Weber, Introduction (1-24); Danny Scoccia, 
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Steven Wall, “Moral environmentalism” in Paternalism: Theory and Practice (101); Michael Cholbi, “Kantian 
paternalism and suicide intervention” in Paternalism: Theory and Practice (115); Jeremy A. Blumenthal, “A 
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New, Government Paternalism: Nanny State or Helpful Friend? (Princeton, 2015), 79, 121, and Ch. 6; John 
Kleinig, Paternalism (Rowman & Allanheld, 1984), 25; Gerald Dworkin, “Paternalism” (73-78); Nicholas 
Dixon, “Boxing, Paternalism, and Legal Moralism” Social Theory and Practice 27 (2001): 324; Richard 
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II.3: The slavery contract 
 
According to Mill, the government is not to interfere with individuals’ liberty in cases where their 
behavior affects no one but themselves.  “Yet,” he says, “this general rule has some exceptions.” 
 
In this and most other civilized countries, for example, an engagement by which a 
person should sell himself, or allow himself to be sold, as a slave, would be null and 
void; neither enforced by law nor by opinion. . . . The reason for not interfering, 
unless for the sake of others, with a person’s voluntary acts, is consideration for his 
liberty. . . . But by selling himself for a slave, he abdicates his liberty; he foregoes 
any future use of it beyond that single act.  He therefore defeats, in his own case, the 
very purpose which is the justification of allowing him to dispose of himself. . . . The 





Mill continues by admitting that the justification of paternalistic intervention for the sake of 
delivering greater net liberty is of “evidently far wider application” than just the case of the slave 
contract.  As Gerald Dworkin has noted in “Paternalism” (1972), “This gives us a principle – a very 
narrow one – by which to justify some paternalistic interferences.  Paternalism is justified only to 
preserve a wider range of freedom for the individual in question” (76).c 
Whether or not the slave contract principle is in fact “very narrow” remains an open question.  
We admit that certain kinds of goods are required for the exercise of liberty, so it may be the case that 
interference in order to protect these goods is justified on the grounds that it opens up a broader range 
of freedom to individuals.  For example, we normally think that a certain level/kind of education is 
required for individuals to exercise freedom; public education requirements could perhaps be justified 
on this argument.
d
  Likewise, goods like health, perhaps some minimum level of material affluence, 
the guarantee of various positive political rights, and the enjoyment of social goods like acceptance 
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 Note that the basis of the argument here is protection of liberty, not respect for reason.  One may reasonably 
wonder if the slavery contract is troublesome only because it involves nonrational behavior, but we should resist 




and love may contribute to our capacity to exercise our liberty, if by liberty we have in mind the 
ability to actualize certain of our potentialities or capacities.
13
   
Sarah Conly has recently taken up this line of argument in her book Against Autonomy: 
Justifying Coercive Paternalism (2013), in which she argues that if “liberty is . . . something that 
should be promoted, it would make more sense to admit that at times the best way to promote it 
overall is to curtail it in particular cases” (50).14  Conly has in mind particular coercive government 
interventions explicitly designed to improve individuals’ health like motorcycle helmet laws, smoking 
bans, bans on fatty foods and oversized sodas, on the argument that protecting health by limiting 
liberty in these particular cases yields increased net liberty to individuals. 
I put off further analysis of Conly’s argument until the next section.  For now, one should note 
that her approach is typical in the paternalism literature.  If we accept Mill’s argument that 
paternalistic intervention is justified when it delivers individuals enhanced liberty, then an obvious 
way to justify paternalistic interference is to show that there are lots of ways beyond refusing to 
enforce slavery contracts that the state can enhance individuals’ liberty.15  Likewise, this line of 
reasoning suggests an important criticism to paternalism: if paternalistic intervention cannot be 
convincingly shown to enhance individuals’ liberty, then it is unjustifiable.  But, as was true above 
with the broken bridge, the weight of this objection against paternalistic interference hinges on our 
acceptance of Mill’s claim that liberty is the only good the government can legitimately intervene to 
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protect.  I argue that we should not accept this claim because it runs aground of pluralist 
commitments. 
 
III. PLURALISTIC PUBLIC JUSTIFICATION AND MILL 
 
Nearly all scholarship about paternalism investigates whether, when, and how paternalistic 
interferences might be justified.  Despite this interest, little to no attention has been paid by 
paternalists to what it means to “justify” a law.  Based on my analysis above, Mill suggests that, 
whatever else it might mean, justification must have to do with respecting rational autonomy and 
protecting liberty.  But is Mill correct?  Briefly, my answer is a qualified negative.  Mill is certainly 
right that justification can involve appeals to reason and liberty, but reason and liberty do not exhaust 
the realm of things on the basis of which justificatory appeals can be made.  In fact, in some cases, 
reason and liberty will be quite distant from our first impressions of what justifies state interference.  
In making this argument against Mill, I aim to show that the paternalism literature of the past forty 
years has been mistakenly narrow in focus; in effect, paternalists have been misguidedly attempting to 
reduce what should be a rich and variable conversation about paternalistic justification into the 
meager terms of only one kind of person (the rational agent) and only one kind of good (liberty). 
 
III.1: Public justification 
 
I begin exploring public justification by activating some of our basic intuitions about politics.  I 
take for granted that laws which interfere with citizen’s liberty stand in need of justification, because 
liberty is a prima facie good.  In other words, it is because citizens suffer (at least a presumptive) 
harm when their liberty is infringed that state interference requires justification.
16
  Thinking about 
justification in this way draws our attention to a link between ethics and politics: justifying interfering 
laws is like making a moral argument that some prima facie wrong actions are morally permissible 
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after all.  In fact, thinking about how moral arguments are structured grants considerable leverage 
over the notion of public justification.  We only need moral arguments when the permissibility of an 
action is in question (and permissibility is usually in question because the action involves at least a 
presumptive bad); when arguments are needed they often require both principled accounts of the 
moral values at stake and certain information about how those principles come to bear on the moral 
context at hand; and moral arguments succeed when they convince us to think the action under 
investigation is permissible.  We should also be attentive to the fact that moral arguments, when they 
succeed, differently succeed in convincing different people about the permissibility of different 
actions in different contexts on the basis of different reasons.  If the analogy between moral 
arguments and public justification is right, we should also expect context-specificity and variety from 
justificatory appeals. 
 A second of our political intuitions begins with the notion that state interference is a special kind 
of presumptive bad because the state is a special kind of moral agent vis a vis its citizens.
e
 The moral 
permissibility of state interference, unlike the permissibility of presumptively wrong actions 
performed by other moral agents, is taken to be bound up in some notion of consent.  In other words, 
the second political intuition to which I want to appeal as is that the consent of the governed is the 
only acceptable grounds for claiming that state interference is morally permissible.  Government 
interference may only be justified by showing that citizens consent to that interference. 
 I also assume that we have pluralist commitments: we recognize and accept that different people 
find moral value in different things and that we are not in a position to say with any authority which 
of those things are “really” valuable.  What this means for public justification is that different people 
will have different reasons for consenting to government interference, and we are generally unable to 
claim that others’ reasons for consent are unacceptable merely because their reasons would not 
convince us.
f
    Because we will generally be unable to resolve disagreements about which reasons are 
sufficient to consent to government interference, irreconcilable disagreement will always be a feature 
14 
 
of pluralistic liberal democracy (John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 36, 58, 136).
17
  What we need is an 
overlapping consensus: it is enough that individuals consent to an interfering law on the basis of 
whatever reasons enable them to do so.  If any laws are justified, justification given pluralism cannot 
require that everyone consents for the same reasons (38, 137).
g
 
The acceptance of inevitable disagreement and call for overlapping consensus do not mean we 
are required to accept consent on the basis any candidate reason (or that we must respect one’s refusal 
to consent on the basis of just any reason).  We think that coerced reasons are not legitimate grounds 
for consent.  We are suspicious of reasons founded on manipulation.
18
 Intuition suggests there’s a 
serious problem with reasons derived from some hysterical or delusional mental states, and 
occasionally we reject reasons which are based on empirical claims which turn out to be wrong.
19
 
All this said about unacceptable reasons, only an inhumane and naïve account of human action 
would fail to incorporate the fact that people make decisions on the basis of more than coldly 
calculated rationality.  People order their lives according to affect, faith, duty, custom, whim, and 
many other things, and we should not dismiss these out of hand as categorically unacceptable reasons 
to consent to government interference.  In the end, which reasons (and which states of reasoning) are 
unacceptable depends on the particular case of interference at hand.  Deciding which reasons we 
might accept as grounds for consent to interference, then, is essentially part of the project of justifying 
interfering laws and should not be settled by some metaphysical prearrangement on philosophers’ 
parts. 
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This leads to the last political intuition to which I want to draw attention: some laws are justified.  
We’ve already committed to the view that justification has something to do with consent.  We’ve also 
acknowledged that even if we accept diverse reasons for consenting, not everyone will consent to any 
law, and some of those who fail to consent will fail for unacceptable reasons.  It seems like the only 
way to reconcile these apparently contradictory commitments is to admit that our demand for consent 
can be satisfied by something less than explicit consent of each and every citizen.  This approach has 
led theorists to ask, hypothetically, what would need to be changed about the unconsenting agents to 
make them consent.
h
  If hypothetical consent is at least sometimes a satisfying alternative to explicit 
consent, then all of our political intuitions and commitments can be simultaneously incorporated into 
an account of public justification. 
The most familiar form of hypothetical consent is secured from individuals who we imbue with 
idealized capacities for reason.  The familiar sentiment is captured by comments like, “of course the 
murderer doesn’t consent to laws against killing, but if only she affirmed the proper social reasons she 
would;” or “the starving beggar doesn’t consent to laws against stealing bread, but if he more 
carefully examined the situation in light of reason, he would.”  Thus, hypothetical consent asks us to 
consider to what an agent would consent if the agent had access to greater deciding resources 
(information, rational capacity, time, etc).  Other nonexplicit consent devices operate in the same 
way.  Proxy consent asks us whether and when another’s consent can be counted in place of the 
agent’s own.  Future consent asks whether we suspect the agent (such as the agent is) would consent 
after having experienced the interference for which the consent is not presently forthcoming.  Tacit 
consent asks whether, regardless of whether the agent knows or acknowledges it, certain nonverbal 
behaviors (consuming public goods, following laws, paying taxes, etc) can satisfy our notion of 
consent for that individual.
i
 
Just as with justificatory reasons, what level of idealization is required, and of which citizens, 
depends on the political context of a particular instance of interference.  We may think that laws 
which affect the fundamental political rights of individuals would need to be justified to a large public 
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that was only at most minimally idealized.  We wouldn’t be convinced that a law depriving women of 
the vote, for example, could be justified if we only considered the consent of hypothetical women and 
not actual women’s explicit nonconsent.  In other cases, such as justifications of laws aimed at 
solving collective dilemmas, we may tolerate relatively extensive idealization.  When justifying 
pollution abatement laws, for example, we may give considerable justificatory weight to the consent 
of hypothetical individuals with special knowledge of how energy markets tend to produce pollution 
externalities and almost no weight to the explicit nonconsent of energy company executives.   
Another way of talking about whose consent is required to justify a law is in terms of “relevant 
publics.”  When we appeal to the consent of hypothetical people for government interference, we are 
specifying a relevant public whose consent or lack of consent determines the justification of 
government interference.  Hypothetical, idealized citizens are members of the relevant public; the 
actual versions of those same citizens are not.  Crucially, we should reject the view that the consent of 
some subgroup of the actual public will never count in the justification of any law (though we have 
acknowledged that the actual public will never constitute the relevant public of a justified law), which 
means we must also reject the claim that some particular level or kind of idealization is always 
appropriate for justifying every law.  In general, we shouldn’t think that all laws should be justified 
with respect to the same relevant public.  Whose unique perspectives on a law matter for its 
justification and why is fundamentally part of the justificatory argument of each interfering law.
j
 
 Given the various political intuitions and commitments I’ve assumed we have, we can now 
construct a Public Justification Principle (PJP).  Public justification has to do with consent.  People 
consent on the basis of reasons, and we can’t be sure in advance what those reasons are or why they 
are acceptable.  Because different people have different reasons and different capacities for 
consenting, we can never expect unanimous explicit consent from the actual public, so we instead rely 
on the explicit consent of a restricted, potentially idealized, hypothetical, relevant public.  Which 
reasons are acceptable and who are members of the relevant public depends on the particularities of 
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the interference at hand, which means justification is about particular laws and not classes of laws.
k
  
These stipulations imply a general PJP formulation such that: 
 
An interfering law λ is justified if and only if each member i of the relevant public P 





III.2: Justificatory arguments 
 
There exists a dual relationship between justified laws and their justificatory arguments.  The 
most natural connection is a causal one: arguments can cause individuals in the relevant public to 
consent to the interference on the basis of acceptable reasons.  Successful justificatory arguments in 
this sense can be understood as strictly contributing to the justification of law.  The familiar notion of 
public discourse is relevant to public justification in this context; the idea is that laws can be made 
justified by the promulgation of convincing justificatory arguments.  In other words, “justified” is a 
property of laws, and justificatory arguments, by convincing individuals to consent to interference, 
can cause a law to come to have the property of being justified. 
While justificatory arguments might have the ability to causally contribute to a law’s justified 
status, causation is not the only purpose for making justificatory arguments.  Notice that the PJP 
states that a law is justified as a matter of fact; if the proper individuals consent to the law, then the 
law is justified.  However, there is no independent method for determining when a law is in fact 
justified; pluralists have a determinacy problem.  Justificatory arguments serve as an attempt to 
overcome that indeterminacy.  If authority only derives from consent and we can’t enumerate all 
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acceptable reasons for consenting in advance, then successful justificatory arguments serve as 
epistemic bases to think a law is justified.  For each law then, successful justificatory arguments 
provide a convincing account of which public is relevant to the particular interference under 
examination (and why), and what reasons might be thought to convince members of that relevant 
public to consent to the interference (and why). 
Given pluralism, the relevant public may be a composite of several distinct groups, each of 
which consents to interference on the basis of different reasons.  If this is true, justificatory arguments 
are most likely to succeed in the epistemic sense when they are able to incorporate a more diverse set 
of acceptable reasons with respect to a more diverse relevant public.  This should draw our attention 
immediately to the inadequacy of attempting to justify paternalism on the narrow moral terrain 
suggested by Mill: restricting our arguments to only liberty and reason simply leaves out too much 
moral data for us to have much confidence in our claims about a law’s justificatory status. 
 
III.3: Returning to the broken bridge 
 
Recall that Mill’s broken bridge case suggests that interference in the free action of individuals 
in self-regarding cases is justified if those individuals are not behaving rationally.  This yields an 
important objection to paternalism: paternalistic interference that forecloses on rationally affirmable 
lives is unjustifiable because hypothetical, rationally-idealized agents are always members of the 
relevant public to which justificatory arguments must appeal for consent.   
 Paternalists have often accepted the spirit of the rational agent objection.  The typical response is 
that the unconsenting idealized agent the objector has in mind simply isn’t ideal enough.  Once one 
traces the appropriate lines of thought and supplements certain pieces of information, goes the 
paternalist’s argument, it turns out that the life featuring paternalistic interference is a life affirmable 
by all hypothetically rational agents.
l
 However, these sorts of replies are routinely unconvincing, 
because the level of idealization that is required for a rationally idealized agent to consent to some 
interferences makes us wonder what their consent has to do with our intuitions about authority over 
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actual agents.  Imagine saying to a Jehovah’s Witness that a law requiring medical professionals to 
perform blood transfusions on her (which conflict with Witnesses’ religious convictions) is justified 
on the grounds that, if only she had “better information” or was “more rational,” she would consent.  
Such an argument promises not only to fail to convince, but also to treat the Witness patronizingly 
and her religious beliefs disrespectfully. 
 A more productive response to the rational agent objection to paternalism is to question the 
underlying assumption that rationally idealized versions of ourselves always wield veto power in the 
justification of government interference.  After all, we’ve already given up on a more moderate 
version of this view by acknowledging the persistence of reasonable disagreement; people within a 
normal range of understanding and rational capacity are just going to disagree, and if we think any 
laws are justifiable, it has to be the case that some rational people will not be members of the relevant 
public in some cases.  If we are willing to accept that some normal rational viewpoints will not be 
authoritative, why should we feel differently about idealized rational viewpoints? 
 Perhaps one reason we should always respect the consent of rationally idealized agents is 
because knowledgeability and reason are developmental capacities, and those who improve them 
enjoy certain epistemic authority over those who don’t.  While any particular actual agent may not 
appreciate the convincingness of an argument for government interference, a rationally ideal but 
actualizable version of that agent, namely, a version who spent more time cultivating the capacity for 
reason, would.  This perspective links ideal agents to actual agents through the actual agents’ capacity 
to develop into their ideal selves, a move which may alleviate our worries that ideal agents’ consent 
has nothing to do with actual agents. 
 But now we should ask why an agent’s epistemic authority on the grounds of capacity 
improvement entitles the agent to moral authority.  Insofar as reason is a perfectible capacity, we 
would need some other argument to show why that particular capacity is the right one to make 
authoritative over moral questions, which themselves form the basis of political justification.  
Someone appealing to their superiorly developed rational capacity to justify their authority over moral 
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and political questions is like a strongman’s appeal to brawn or a cheat’s appeal to cunning.  I needn’t 
be (and I’m not) committed to the view that reason isn’t in fact a right basis on which to claim some 
moral and political authority.  Rather, I simply want to draw attention to the fact that to so claim is to 
impose a skill-based moral hierarchy on other normally-competent citizens which, if the foundational 
skill were strength or guise, we would otherwise find reprehensible.  If reason is the right authority, 
we ought to be able to explain why, and that explanation ought to be convincing to a (very) 
imperfectly rational person.  The claim to legitimate authority of greater brawn, for example, could be 
made quite clear both to the strong and to the weak, and we should demand the same broad appeal 
from any other justification of a skill-based hierarchical authority.  It’s quite unclear, I think, what 
genuine legitimacy an argument in support of reason as a moral and political authority could claim if 
it was only convincing to those whose authority it sought to legitimate. 
 Suppose we can make a broadly convincing defense of reason as an acceptable foundation for 
some moral and political claim.  The difficulty for someone claiming special moral authority for 
rationally idealized agents doesn’t end there; now we have to confront the fact that only certain 
perspectives are seen as appropriate from which to reason.  What I do not mean by this is that only 
members of particular groups have access to reason.  Rather, what I want to convey is something like 
what Virginia Woolf meant by “writing like a man:” attention must be paid to certain features of 
decision contexts while others ought to be ignored; reason ought to take place in the absence of 
emotion; we ought to adopt a particular attitude toward the evaluation of certain benefits and risks; 
etc.
21
  Clearly one’s ability to do these things is not strictly a function of one’s race or gender or 
affluence or whatever.  But whether one thinks these are the right things to do while reasoning about 
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morality and politics in fact may be.  Note well that the issue here is not that our perspectives are 
making us better or worse informed.  Given any arbitrary level of rational idealization, which of all 
the features of a decision context strike the agent as relevant or salient depends unavoidably on the 
perspective from which that agent approaches the choice, and each of us is inescapably constrained to 
our own (and perhaps a few other proximate) perspectives.
m
 
I am suggesting that paternalists have been mistaken to accept the broken bridge case’s 
underlying assumption that paternalistic interference is never justified if it forecloses on lives rational 
agents can affirm, because we don’t have a reason to think in advance that the relevant public 
contains all and only rational agents.  To make the case that the relevant public was so composed in a 
particular case of interference, the objector would need to provide convincing answers to the 
following questions.  Why is reason the best basis for moral and political authority in this case?  
Whose perspectives on the instance of interference under examination should we take as the correct 
ones from which to reason?  How can we show, after those questions have been settled, what reason 
demands?  But notice that these questions are themselves the very basis of a justificatory argument 
that the objection sought in the first place to undermine.  Satisfying answers would convince us who 
the relevant public is in context and why, and how we could imagine the interference obtaining (or 
failing to obtain) unanimous consent within that public.   
 Mill’s rational agent objection to paternalism thus begs the question.  Rather than showing that a 
particular interference is unjustified, it asks us to re-justify with respect to a rationally idealized 
relevant public.  But the sorts of arguments, reasons, and data that could be mobilized to convincingly 
justify the political authority of rationally idealized agents will vary along with the political context.  
More importantly, successful justificatory arguments in some contexts won’t refer to a rationally 
idealized relevant public at all.  Thus, by rejecting the broken bridge case as the only type of instance 
in which paternalism might be justified, we become capable of attending to the possibility that 
justificatory arguments according to the PJP may appeal to more than just reason.  There are no 
grounds for assuming in advance that these kinds of arguments will fail in every case.   
22 
 
By moving away from Mill in this regard, paternalists may be better able to justify paternalistic 
interference on the grounds of affect, duty, or other moral values we as pluralists already affirm.  
Elizabeth Anderson has offered one such argument in favor of paternalistic market interventions that 
becomes available beyond Mill.
22
  She argues that as democratic citizens we have duties to one 
another that prevent us from tolerating excessive risk burdens on fellow citizens who face those risks 
as a consequence of performing socially important roles.  This argument has nothing to do with 
reason and everything to do with the types of social commitments properly democratically-minded 
individuals (whatever their capacities for reason) are supposed to have. 
 
III.4: Returning to the slavery contract 
 
Mill’s recognition that slavery contracts are “enforced neither by law nor by opinion” has 
prompted the principle that “paternalism is justified only to preserve a wider range of freedom for the 
individual in question” (Dworkin, “Paternalism,” 76).  The spirit of this claim, in the terms of public 
justification I have provided, is that – whoever the relevant public is in a given situation – the only 
reason members of the relevant public would consent to interference is if they enjoyed more liberty 
with the interference than without.  Paternalists have often accepted the spirit of this argument: 
“[W]hile the paternalist concedes that all things considered, it is good to have more liberty rather than 
less, the paternalist would say that sometimes we need to take away someone’s liberty so that in the 
end they can have more liberty” (Conly, 50).  Sometimes this means refusing to honor slavery 
contracts.  Other times it may mean using government authority to coerce motorcyclists into wearing 
helmets or drivers seatbelts.  In still other contexts, this argument might be mobilized to justify the 
demand that children attend mandatory schooling. 
 Sarah Conly’s strain of argument makes it clear to us how broadly liberty can reach as an 
important reason to accept government interference.  However, arguing within the context of liberty 
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has also produced the effect of affirming liberty as the only good on the basis of which to argue for 
justified interference.  As a result, paternalists face two dangers.  First, attempting to reduce all other 
goods (life, wealth, happiness, etc) to instantiations or expressions of liberty stretches the notion of 
liberty past its elastic limits.  Second, treating liberty as a uniquely intrinsically valuable political 
good wrongly suggests that all other goods are merely instrumental goods required for the expression 
or enjoyment of liberty.
23
  Gerald Dworkin has expressed this latter concern about Conly, 
 
almost all the examples that Conly gives to illustrate justified paternalism are ones 
where the over-all satisfaction of the agent's desires is maximized by curtailing 
liberty. If we stop people from drinking sugared beverages it is their health, or 
longevity, that is promoted. Valuable things to be sure but not their liberty. If one 
accepted the view that liberty may only be interfered with by a paternalist to promote 






Paternalists should take seriously the failure of liberty to be a universally convincing basis for 
paternalistic government interference.  To do so, they must reject the presumption built into Mill’s 
slavery contract case that liberty is the only reason we ought to accept government interference.
25
 
This of course is not to suggest that liberty isn’t one, and an important one, of the many reasons we 
should faithfully entertain in our justificatory arguments (indeed, it is the curtailing of liberty that 
cause interferences to require justification in the first place).  But, if we are committed to pluralism, 
we also acknowledge that reasonable people may find many different reasons to consent to 
interference; claiming a special authority for liberty ignores the content of our lived social experience 
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and shared, complex moral sensitivities and creates artificial barriers to the project of justification that 
motivates the paternalism literature.  If paternalists move away from Mill in this respect, new and 
potentially better justificatory arguments for paternalistic intervention might be motivated by appeals 
to goods that cannot be convincingly expressed as instantiations or requisites of liberty. 
 
IV. ELIXIR SULFANILAMIDE AND PATERNALISTIC INTERVENTION 
 
In this final section, I use the case of premarket drug regulation to motivate my criticism of 
taking too seriously Mill on paternalism.  In 1938, the United States passed the Federal Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic (FD&C) Act, partially in response to a nationwide poisoning event in 1937 by an 
untested drug called Elixir Sulfanilamide.  Drug market regulations designed to prevent mass 
poisoning events seem to be uncontroversially justified, which makes the FD&C Act a useful 
calibration tool for justificatory arguments.  I want to suggest that the most immediate and basic 
moral response many have toward the Elixir Sulfanilamide Disaster stems from our intolerance of 
certain kinds of vulnerability to preventable risk, which is irreducible either to protecting liberty or to 
exclusively rational beliefs/desires.  If this is correct, then justificatory arguments which adopt liberty 
and rationality as exclusive foci fail to convincingly illuminate the law’s status as justified.  
Therefore, by distancing ourselves from Mill with respect to paternalism, our justificatory arguments 
will be more likely to succeed in their epistemic aims, because they will be better able to capture the 
real moral motivations behind normal people’s actual consent to paternalistic interference. 
 
IV.1: The Elixir Sulfanilamide Disaster of 1937 
 
In early September of 1937, the first shipments of Elixir Sulfanilamide, a new liquid form of the 
popular antibacterial chemical sulfanilamide, were delivered to pharmacists for sale around the 
United States.
26
  In pill and powder form, sulfanilamide had been used to effectively treat 
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streptococcal and yeast infections (the latter for which it remains in use today) for nearly thirty years, 
but the liquid form had only recently been developed in response to market demand from southern 
states.  At the time, safety testing was not required before new drugs were released to the market; 
federal law required only that active ingredients, color additives, and preservatives already known to 
be dangerous be labeled.
27
 Elixir Sulfanilamide was lab-tested for flavor, appearance, and fragrance 
prior to delivery, but, because no pharmacological testing was completed, chemists failed to note that 
the solvent used to create the solution, diethylene glycol, more commonly known as antifreeze, is 
toxic to humans.   
Within a month, the American Medical Association had begun to receive reports of deaths due to 
Elixir Sulfanilamide.  By the time FDA agents were able to seize the remaining drugs, more than 100 
people across 15 states, mostly children, where dead.
n
 The disaster prompted the passage of the new 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, which granted the FDA new powers to regulate drug 
markets, including premarket efficacy and safety testing and informative labeling of dangerous drug 
effects.  The FD&C Act remains the legal framework for FDA drug regulation today, and it’s thanks 
to this legislation (and heroic implementation by an FDA inspector named Frances Kelsey) that the 
United States narrowly avoided another even larger untested drug disaster that affected thousands of 
newborns in forty-six countries during the late 1950s and early 1960s.
28
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IV.2: Justifying FDA premarket regulation 
 
I take for granted that the federal government’s response to the Elixir Sulfanilamide Disaster is 
justified.  While I don’t want to make any rigid claims about who the relevant public for premarket 
drug regulation must be, I am comfortable with asserting that those who fail to consent either embrace 
unacceptable reasons or have unsatisfying consenting faculties (and are thus not members of the 
relevant public).  If the FD&C Act is in fact justified, then our justificatory arguments will succeed 
when they illuminate the various reasons members of the relevant public consent to the law.  The 
FD&C Act is a particularly helpful case for paternalistic justification, because it shows that arguments 
which remain in the context of Mill’s broken bridge and slavery contract fail. 
 While I don’t think that Millian arguments that the FD&C Act is justified succeed, that doesn’t 
mean one couldn’t make them.  We could argue that premarket intervention is justified on the basis of 
protecting liberty.  One minimal requirement for the free exercise of liberty is possession of 
information relevant to one’s decisions, especially, perhaps, when withheld information could lead to 
one’s inadvertent self-poisoning.  Premarket interventions to at least test for possible dangerous side 
effects for drugs and label them accordingly thus restrict individuals’ liberty to buy and sell drugs 
with unknown effects for the sake of protecting their liberty to make health-conscious decisions. 
(These decisions also endow individuals with additional future liberty, insofar as the exercise of 
liberty requires one to be alive.)  Furthermore, like Mill, we could emphasize premarket intervention 
in terms of rational agents.  No rational agent, Mill says, could possibly want to ignorantly purchase a 
drug that turns out to be poisonous (On Liberty, 107); premarket drug testing is thus justified with 
respect to the rationally idealized relevant public.  Following the trend of accepting the broken bridge 
and slave contract cases in Mill allows us to justify paternalistic regulatory interferences on these 
grounds, but not on others. 
 This strategy is inadequate because it fails to capture what strikes many of us as most morally 
salient about the Elixir Sulfanilamide Disaster.  For example, neither liberty nor rationality are able to 
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incorporate the spirt of political arguments by FDA Commissioner Walter Campbell in favor of 
passing the FD&C Act in 1938: 
 
[The Elixir Sulfanilamide Disaster] emphasizes how essential it is to public welfare 
that the distribution of highly potent drugs should be controlled by an adequate 
Federal Food and Drug law. . . . These unfortunate occurrences may be expected to 
continue because new and relatively untried drug preparations are being 
manufactured almost daily at the whim of the individual manufacturer, and the 
damage to public health cannot accurately be estimated.  The only remedy for such a 
situation is the enactment by Congress of an 
 . . . Act which will require that all medicines placed upon the market shall be safe to 




The bill is not intended to restrict in any way the availability of drugs for self-






The root problem with having no premarket drug safety and efficacy testing is that untested and 
deadly drugs present unacceptable risks to normally intelligent and cognizant people.  It would 
require a supernormal level of medical awareness to overcome the vulnerability one faces when 
deadly drugs are hidden amongst safe drugs at the local pharmacy, and it’s that vulnerability we find 
morally intolerable.  The first way in which Millian arguments fail, then, is that they wrongly ask us 
to abstract away from the awfulness of the situation.  Justification doesn’t require us to suppress our 
simplest moral sensitivities, and if it’s on the basis of those sensitivities that members of the relevant 
public are capable of consenting to paternalistic interference, then arguments that do suppress them 
fail to reach their epistemic goals.  The horrifying fact is that normally intelligent citizens ended up 
killing themselves and their children with what was claimed by their hometown pharmacists to be a 
safe and effective drug.  If that horror forms the basis of individuals’ consent to FDA premarket 
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regulation, then rendering a successful justificatory argument requires us to distance ourselves from 
Mill’s exclusive focus on liberty and reason. 
To this one might insist, like Mill, that FDA drug regulations are simply a broken bridge case: no 
rational agent would voluntarily face such vulnerability.  It might be true that there is something 
inherently irrational about self-exposure to some risks, but there’s no good reason to restrict the 
discourse to what rational agents would accept as opposed to what, say, properly empathetic agents 
would accept.  My guess is that our normal reaction to someone who rejects premarket drug 
regulation is one of confusion at their unfeelingness toward the vulnerability of real persons, not some 
relatively abstract failure in their capacity for reason.  Vulnerability simply isn’t about idealized 
rational agents; it’s about “normal” or “average” agents.  Deciding which drug dangers are tolerated 
and which are not is simply part of how “[n]ormal persons make the world safe for normality,”31 like 
expiration dates, building codes, workplace safety standards, and innumerable other familiar 
regulations. 
Neither will it do to express vulnerability as a slave contract case about liberty.  Undoubtedly 
some of the harms that individuals risk in the absence of regulation – sickness, disability, death – are 
also tied up in their enjoyment of liberty, but as I argued above, justificatory arguments that attempt 
to reduce these other important goods to liberty are not only unconvincing but also run aground of 
pluralist commitments.  Moreover, Millian arguments fail in a second way insofar as they fail to 
recognize that justifying intervention on the basis of vulnerability may be necessarily prior to the 
possibility of justifications on the grounds of liberty.  As Daniel Wikler (1979) has suggested,  
 
Human beings of average intellect, living in their own society, can insist on 
autonomy not because they are “persons” in [a rationally idealized] sense, but 
because, with respect to the challenges they have fashioned for themselves, they are 
nearly on par with [ideal] persons. . . . The notion that a right to self-direction 
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attaches to those of a given level of intelligence, simply because of that mental ability 
and regardless of environmental circumstances, seems impossible to defend.
32
   
 
 
It may only make sense to insist on respect for individual liberty if individuals’ capacities are suited 
for navigating the risk structures of their environments.  What we take to be tolerable exposures to 
accidental harm by everyday actual agents is determined endogenously according to the 
environmental factors which determine actual agents’ abilities to successfully manage risk themselves 




Much of the paternalist literature of the past forty years has attempted to specify which 
paternalistic interferences by governments in the lives of citizens can be justified.  Many of these 
attempts have been unconvincing both to paternalists and to antipaternalists.  I have argued in this 
essay that part of the reason paternalistic justificatory arguments have been unsuccessful is because 
paternalists have mistakenly restricted themselves to the narrow moral terrain marked out for 
paternalism by Mill in On Liberty.  Mill is certainly correct that liberty is a valuable political good 
and that rational agents’ consent matters when determining if laws are justified, but these two 
concepts cannot account for the breadth of values we as pluralists are committed to embracing.  Mill’s 
restricted universe of moral discourse not only fails to equip arguments with satisfactory force to 
convince us that controversial interferences may be justified; liberty and reason together are not even 
sufficient to explain why normal people consent to uncontroversially justified interferences.  Drawing 
on the example of FDA premarket drug regulation, I argued that paternalistic justificatory arguments 
will continue to fail to convince if they follow Mill in suppressing our most basic moral sensitivities, 
which themselves serve as the basis for consent to interference. 
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APPENDIX: DEFINING PATERNALISM 
 
It is beyond the scope of this article to provide a full defense of a definition of paternalism, 
especially when there is no shortage of definitions already available on the shelf.
33
 I will be satisfied 
by offering a conceptual framework that captures our normal intuitions about how paternalistic 
behaviors differ from nonpaternalistic ones, and I hope to formulate a definition that doesn’t 
predetermine justificatory questions.   
As the term paternalism suggests, an individual acting paternalistically toward another is related 
somehow to a parent acting paternally toward their child.
34
 One part of this relation has to do with 
capturing the motivation behind parents’ behaviors toward their children. The foundation of the 
parent-child relationship is the special obligation parents have to their children, namely, to consider 
the child’s best interests in any relevant circumstances when the parent’s behavior affects the child.  
Genuinely paternal behavior consists in genuinely altruistic motivation; parents don’t behave 
exclusively paternally toward their children, but we might distinguish those times that they do by the 
motivation behind their actions. 
To motivate this line of reasoning, consider whether the same given action may at some times 
seem genuinely paternal and in others genuinely nonpaternal.  If a mother slaps an ice cream cone out 
of her daughter’s hand onto the ground because she realized at the last second that the cone had 
peanut ingredients (to which her daughter is deathly allergic) she behaves paternally.  If she slaps the 
same cone onto the ground purely maliciously, she behaves nonpaternally.  I want to draw attention to 
the motivation behind the action here and not what may strike one as the moral reprehensibility of the 
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negative connotations of patronization and patriarchy that I don’t intend.  The right kind of connotation, 
nurturing and care, is more closely associated with “maternal,” but that isn’t the word adopted by tradition. 
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action, as even benignly altruistically-motivated actions can nevertheless turn out to be morally 
reprehensible. 
A second way we think paternalism is related to parenting concerns authority.  While I think 
parents do (and should) incorporate their children’s perspectives when deciding things for them, 
parents are not typically morally constrained by the mere fact that a child may not appreciate paternal 
treatment.  Deciding whether or not the treatment is appropriate belongs entirely to the parent: while a 
parent may hope the child understands – or, better yet, appreciates – the paternal treatment, whether 
or not a treatment is in fact in the best interests of the child is (at the moment of action) up to the 
parent.  The parent is assumed to be in an epistemic position to know better the needs of the child, 
and it is on the basis of this epistemic authority that the parent’s judgement of how the child ought to 
be treated is morally defended.  Of course parents can be wrong and children can be right, but I 
assume we normally acknowledge that parents are the better judges of what’s good for their children 
than the children themselves, and that without this acknowledgement, normal paternal authority 
would be much more morally dubious. 
I define paternalism in general as the coincidence of these two features of action between any 
two moral agents, because that definition captures our intuitions about paternalism without 
presupposing anything about the goods or publics one might reference when justifying it.  The mere 
fact that someone acts on the basis of a good does not imply that the action is justified.  Substitute 
judgement may strike us as a prima facie wrong, but this merely prompts us to demand justificatory 
arguments for paternalistic actions.  What reasons and what publics are mobilized as components to 
those arguments (and the arguments’ successes) are not presupposed by the definition of paternalism: 
 
A’s behavior X toward S is paternalistic if A performs X out of an altruistic motivation to 
secure some good to S, and A substitutes A’s own judgement about S’s preferences for X for 
S’s.35 
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Let government paternalism be a special kind of paternalistic behavior where X is a law enacted 
by a government A toward a citizen (or group of citizens) S.  On this specification of government 
paternalism, I assume the state has the capacities a) to act, b) to be motivated in action by its citizens’ 
well-being, and c) to substitute its judgement about the consequences of its actions for the stated 
preferences of at least some affected citizens.  It may be dubious to assume that states have capacities 
a) and b), but notice that capacity c) is uncontroversial.  Given the assumption of reasonable 
disagreement, the capacity for substitute judgement is a necessary condition for the pluralist state. 
This definition of paternalism in terms of altruism draws our attention helpfully to the fact that 
we often have multiple motivations behind our actions.  It might be that some actions are purely 
altruistic, and many may turn out to be purely egoistic.  I assume, however, that some of our actions 
have mixed motivations: among the reasons we perform a given action are reasons related to our own 
private good as well as reasons genuinely related to the goods of others.  While this understanding of 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Accommodation” Philosophy & Public Affairs 29 (2000): 205-250; and Donald VanDeVeer, Paternalistic 
Intervention: The Moral Bounds of Benevolence (Princeton, 1986), 22. 
Figure 1: Diagram of paternalism definition 
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paternalism does not preemptively decide the justificatory question in the case of any paternalistic 
behavior, it does draw attention to the fact that a given paternalistic behavior may be justified on the 
basis of either egoistic or altruistic reasons, or both.  My formulation leaves us helpfully attentive to 
the possibility that paternalistic laws, which are motivated by at least some altruistic concerns, might 









 Whether or not Mill was committed to pluralism is itself a matter of some debate, an issue I hope to 
sidestep here.  See Graham Finlay, “John Stuart Mill on the Uses of Diversity” Utilitas 14 (2002): 
189-218; Alex Zakaras, “A Liberal Pluralism: Isaiah Berlin and John Stuart Mill” The Review of 
Politics 75 (2013): 69-96; Katherine Smits, “John Stuart Mill and the Social Construction of Identity” 
History of Political Thought 25 (2004): 298-324; Jason Tyndal, “Culture and Diversity in John Stuart 
Mill’s Civic Nation” Utilitas 25 (2013): 96-120. 
b
 Feinberg acknowledges that, insofar as our nonvoluntary (read: nonrational) actions are “foreign to 
us,” weak paternalism may not even be paternalism.  If paternalism is minimally defined as having 
something to do with protecting people from themselves, and if we protect a person from their 
nonrational self – who’s a genuine moral “other” – then we don’t seem to be treating them 
paternalistically after all (Harm to Self, 12).  Likewise, Thaler and Sunstein’s split personality 
psychology suggests not only that their “libertarian paternalism” is rather benign – it seems like it 
might not even be paternalism. 
c
 As with respect for rational agents above, the argument that liberty is a good worth protecting is not 
uniquely Millian.  See John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed., Peter Laslett (Cambridge, 
2013), Book II, Chapter iv, paragraphs 22-23, page 283-284; Lawrence Alexander, “Voluntary 
enslavement” in Paternalism: Theory and Practice (231). 
d
 One might note that Mill expressly argued against public education in On Liberty, but this argument 
was an economic one against public provision of goods, not an argument that education is not 
required for the exercise of liberty (118). 
e
 I cannot explore the various and important difficulties involved in attributing agency to states.  
When does a state act?  Do states have motivations?  Do states have reasons?  While it is typical in 
the paternalism literature to treat states as moral agents without addressing these foundational 
difficulties, the difficulties nevertheless still loom in the background. 
f
 Many of our reasons for consenting or not consenting to interference are dictated to us by our 
adherence to particular life plans by which we order our moral lives, and arguments on the basis of 
one’s own life plan that another’s reasons for consenting are misguided fail to convince precisely 
because such arguments only derive their force from the preexisting acceptance of one’s own plan.  
These disagreements cannot be resolved through appeals to reason, because “a person’s interests and 
aims are rational if, and only if, they are to be encouraged and provided for by the plan that is rational 
for him,” John Rawls, Theory of Justice, Revised Edition (Belknap, 1999), VIII.63, page 359.  “[A] 
conception of the good normally consists of a more or less determinate scheme of final ends, that is, 
ends we want to realize for their own sake, as well as attachments to other persons and loyalties to 
various groups and associations.  These attachments and loyalties give rise to devotions and 
affections, and so the flourishing of the persons and associations who are the objects of these 
sentiments is also part of our conception of the good,” Rawls, Political Liberalism, Expanded Edition 
(Columbia University Press, 2005), 1:I, §3.3, page 19.  See also Rawls’s definition of a reasonable 






 While I have clearly been drawing from Rawls on the topic of pluralistic public justification, this 
comment is not a strictly correct representation of Rawls.  Rawls thought that only “reasonable” 
comprehensive doctrines could form the basis of a democratic overlapping consensus.  Rawls 
recommends we recognize as reasonable reasons for consenting only those which it is rational for a 
person to have given that person’s rational life plan, even if those reasons are not authoritative for us 
given our plan (Political Liberalism, 482-483).  However, this view of which reasons for consent are 
acceptable is not the most general formulation.  See Vallier and D’Agostino, “Public Justification,” 
section 3.2, pages 10-17. 
h
 For Rawls, a law is justified when “all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to 
endorse [it] in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason”, Political 
Liberalism, 2:IV, §1.3, page 137.  The emphasis is mine, and it is intended to draw attention to the 
interpretation of Rawls as asking how hypothetical people – who were was similar in all relevant 
ways to the citizens as they are except with respect to their access to reason and the principles and 
ideals revealed thereby – could be expected to react to the law.  See also Vallier and D’Agostino, 
section 2.4, page 17. 
i
 The various methods of dealing with disagreement are traditionally referred to as different kinds of 
consent, but hypothetical consent among actual agents is conceptually equivalent to explicit consent 
among idealized agents.  Indeed, important objections to hypothetical consent as a method of 
justification point to the fear that excessive idealization leads to a consenting agent who is so much 
different from the actual agent that the idealized agent’s consent to interference no longer satisfies our 
intuitive demand for consent by actual people.  After all, it would be hard for me to convince you that 
you’ve consented to a law when you haven’t, simply by telling you that you would consent, if only 
you were better informed or were a more careful thinker (though philosophers say this about abstract 
people all the time).  See Vallier and D’Agostino, section 2.4, pages 19-23.  I choose to express 
various notions of consent in terms of idealized versus actual agents, because doing so draws 
attention to problems with the Millian objection to paternalism I examine in this section. 
 I also want to mention briefly that tacit consent may strike the reader as not readily expressed in 
terms of agent idealization.  I cannot adequately respond to that concern without going some distance 
afield.  All I will say is that where tacit consent seems like a satisfying alternative to explicit consent 
(which is not always the case), one can conceptually frame it as the explicit consent of a hypothetical 
agent who was more attentive to the relationship between the agent’s livelihood (consumption of 
public goods, obedience to laws, enjoyment of rights) than is the actual agent. 
j
 The relevant versus actual public distinction is also amenable to domination terminology.  That 
one’s own consent is irrelevant to the justification of another’s interference with one’s own life must 
be a basic feature of domination broadly construed.  If any law is to be justified, then some members 
of the actual public will not be members of the relevant public: they will be dominated.  At the end of 
the day, not all forms of life are acceptable to us, and this kind of restriction of our freedom is simply 
a fact of shared social existence.  Thus, the question of political justification is always partly a 
question of which people a particular law can tolerably dominate.  By rejecting the view that some 





members of the actual public (in particular those who don’t reason well or with the best information 
or with as much practice or from the “right” perspective) are always tolerably dominated. 
k
 To show that classes of laws are justified, one must show that every member of the class is justified.  
Thus, the only way to show that all laws of a type P are unjustified without enumerating P’s elements 
is to define the P-type as a type whose instantiations always entail an unjustifiable feature.  This 
amounts to “defining away” the justificatory question with respect to P-type laws; saying that a law of 
type P is unjustified is nothing more than appealing to the definition of the type.  If we are motivated 
by the question of justifying a law λ, then, we should take care not to define λ such that its 
justification is determined ahead of time, because doing so prevents, rather than enlightens, 
justificatory argumentation about λ.  I mention this here, because many scholars who are not 
interested in justificatory arguments about paternalism have opted to simply define them away by 
including a law’s (un)justified status as part of the definition of paternalism.  See for examples Philip 
Pettit, On the People’s Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy (Cambridge, 2012), 6: 
n2; Simon Caney, Justice Beyond Borders (Oxford, 2005), 75; Elizabeth Anderson, “What Is the 
Point of Equality?” Ethics 109 (1999): 287-337, 301. 
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 These arguments are also characterized by a tendency to slip into the language of “perfect” reason or 
“perfect” information (Vallier and D’Agostino, section 2.4.1, pages 19-20).  The appeal of the 
consent of a perfectly rational person probably derives from Kant, who argued that moral principles 
are determined by reason and that, insofar as humans are rational, moral principles are available to 
them to the extent that they exercise their capacity for reason correctly.  On this view, moral 
principles are made objectively determinant by reason, which suggests that agents who exercise their 
capacities for reason perfectly (so-called perfectly rational and perfectly informed agents) would 
grasp the truth of moral principles perfectly.  But of course, humans are not perfectly rational agents, 
and our imperfect exercise of reason is simply a feature of human life and not something we will ever 
overcome.  What a being who did not suffer from our cognitive hurdles would do or think or believe 
is strictly beyond our imaginative capacities.  To what a “perfectly” rational or “perfectly” informed 
agent might consent cannot be the basis of political justification, because it is perfectly noumenal. 
m
 In epistemology, this recalls Sir Francis Bacon and Edmund Husserl.  To continue my reference to 
Woolf, consider, “It would be a thousand pities if women wrote like men, or lived like men, or looked 
like men, for if two sexes are quite inadequate, considering the vastness and variety of the world, how 
should we manage with one only?” (86).  For more contemporary scholarship on this idea, see 
especially recent work in behavioral economics by John List.  Ori Heffetz and John A. List, “Is the 
Endowment Effect an Expectations Effect?” Journal of the European Economic Association 12 
(2014): 1396-1422; John A. List, “Does Market Experience Eliminate Market Anomalies? The Case 
of Exogenous Market Experience,” American Economic Review 101 (2011): 313- 317; Glenn W. 
Harrison, John A. List, and Charles Towe, “Naturally Occurring Preferences and Exogenous 
Laboratory Experiments: A Case Study of Risk Aversion,” Econometrica 75 (2007): 433-458. 
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a disproportionate quantity of liquid medicines relative to adults, putting them at higher risk of 
ingesting Elixir Sulfanilamide in the first place.  Second, the lethal dose of diethylene glycol is 38g 
for children and 71g in adults, making children relatively more vulnerable to a given exposure than 
adults.  Leslie M. Shaw, ed., The Clinical Toxicology Laboratory: Contemporary Practice of 
Poisoning Evaluation (Washington, D.C.: AACC Press, 2001), 197. 
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 Many writers define paternalism either as justified in a certain way or as involving justificatory 
appeals to particular kinds of goods or reasons.  These same writers typically express intentions of 
showing that some (not all and not no) paternalistic laws are justified, but by defining paternalism as 
a law justified in a particular way they immediately undermine their own aim of explicating the 
justification of such laws.  See especially Kleinig, Paternalism, 18; Feinberg, Harm to Self, 54; 
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